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Income distribution is extremely important for development, since it influences the cohesion of
society, determines the extent of poverty for any given average per capita income and the
poverty-reducing effects of growth, and even affects people’s health. The paper reviews the
connections between income distribution and economic growth. It finds that the Kuznets
hypothesis that income distribution worsens as levels of income increase is not at all strongly
supported by the evidence, while growth rates of income are not systematically related to
changes in income distribution. However, evidence is accumulating that more equal income
distribution raises economic growth. Both political and economic explanations have been
advanced. The finding suggests that more equal income distribution is desirable both for equity
and for promoting growth. 
Strategies to promote more egalitarian growth are reviewed, with examples given. However,
although these strategies seem both feasible and desirable, in the 1980s and 1990s there has
been a strong tendency for income distribution to worsen in both developed and developing
countries. A variety of explanations as to the cause for this have been advanced including trade
liberalization, technology change, and the impact of liberalization and globalization more
generally. Most of the paper is concerned with the distribution of pre-tax household income. A
brief survey of findings on the incidence of taxation and expenditure shows that tax incidence is
often neutral, or proportionate to income, and occasionally either progressive or regressive. In
contrast, the incidence of public expenditure is mostly progressive, so an increase in the levels of
taxation and expenditure would tend to improve the distribution of welfare. Little direct
evidence has been collected on the distribution of measures of well-being, such as human
development indicators, but there is strong evidence that health achievements are related to
income levels, while average societal health standards tend to worsen as inequality increases. 
Most of the paper, along with much of the literature, is devoted to exploring the traditional
concept of vertical income distribution The paper points to the importance of examining
horizontal inequalities (or inequalities between groups divided on religious, ethnic, racial or
other cultural grounds), since these are closely related to societal stability. In conclusion, all the
analysis and evidence points to the desirability of achieving egalitarian income distribution for
development. Yet current trends seem to be going in the opposite direction.
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INTRODUCTION
The distribution of income within a society is of enormous importance. It influences the cohesion
of the society and, for any given level of GDP, determines its poverty level. Some relatively high-income
economies have very unequal income distribution with the result that there are large cleavages in society
and high levels of poverty, as in Brazil. Other countries with more equal income distribution have less
poverty and there is a sense of fairness within the society which makes for political stability, as in Costa
Rica. The sensitivity of poverty to growth depends on a country’s income distribution; for example, a 1
per cent growth rate of GDP leads to a 0.21 per cent reduction in poverty in Zambia, if distribution is
unchanged, compared with a 3.4 per cent reduction in Malaysia (Sen, 1995). There is also
considerable evidence that the distribution of income has a significant influence on the rate of growth,
with more equal societies growing faster than less equal ones. Moreover, the average health status of a
society depends on its income distribution, to that countries with more unequal distributions experience
lower life expectancy.1 An equitable distribution of income, as well as the achievement of social goals,
are, therefore, essential aspects of development, over and above economic growth.
This paper aims to explore the connections between income distribution and economic growth,
and to identify some policy conclusions emerging from the analysis. There have been many
investigations of the relationship between income distribution and development, starting with a classic
paper by Kuznets, who argued that income distribution was generally relatively more equal at low levels
of income in the early stages of development, became more unequal as development proceeded, and
finally a reverse move took place so that income distribution became more equal again as countries
approached the levels of incomes of the developed countries. The work of Kuznets, and others,
identified correlations between levels and growth of per capita income and income distribution. Behind
these correlations lie two possible types of causality: first, how growth affects the distribution of income;
and secondly, how distribution affects growth. Both will be investigated, before exploring recent trends
in income distribution.
The paper is organized as follows: section I considers some important definitional issues; section
II reviews findings on the ways in which growth affects income distribution; section III looks at the
reverse causality, i.e. how income distribution affects growth; section IV discusses growth strategies
which are likely to generate more equal income distribution; section V reviews recent trends in income
distribution; section VI explores wider dimensions of inequality extending beyond pre-tax private
incomes, to encompass the incidence taxation and expenditure, and some indicators of inequalities in
capabilities; section VII discusses horizontal (or group) inequalities; section VIII briefly reviews changes
in global income distribution; and finally, section IX concludes.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 4
2 There is, of course, a lot of overlap among these alternatives.
I.  SOME IMPORTANT DEFINITION ISSUES
Key issues concern distribution of what, among whom and within which unit.
(a) Distribution of what?  In almost all discourse, the focus is on the distribution of current
monetary (or private) income – normally pre-tax and subsidy but sometimes post-tax and subsidy.
Even within the ‘income’ paradigm of welfare, one needs to extend this to include future income (e.g.
by adding current asset distribution). But alternative approaches to well-being suggest the need for
concern with one, other, or all of the following: the distribution of social income (i.e. goods and services
provided by the State) as well as private income; distribution of capabilities or functioning; of basic
needs goods and services; or of human development achievements.2 A broader approach to
distribution is needed, whether it is a matter of assessing distribution in a society from the perspective of
well-being, or from that of investment (i.e. the impact of current distribution on growth). For example,
inequality in access to education, which is acute in many societies, is a major influence on future
household income, and may also affect the rate of growth, since in many occupations those deprived of
education are unlikely to be as productive as the educated. Inequality in access to health services can
be much more important than inequality in private incomes, since life itself may depend upon it.
Nonetheless, most of the literature focuses on the distribution of private incomes. 
In addition to household income distribution, there is the question of functional income
distribution, i.e. the distribution between profits, wages, rents, etc. This indeed was the ‘great’ question
of Ricardo on household distribution. Functional distribution is important because it is a major
determinant of household distribution, as well as being a determinant of savings, accumulation, and
growth. Yet it is virtually ignored in most current empirical, and much theoretical, work (see, for
example, reviews by Kanbur and Lustig, 1999; Kanbur, 1998). 
(b) Distribution among whom?  The appropriate level of analysis depends on why the information
is needed. If the aim is to assess well-being, and an individualistic approach to well-being is adopted –
as with utilitarian and capability approaches – then the individual is the appropriate level. But much of
the data is collected at a household level, as it is difficult to get information at the level of the individual.
Frequently, household and individual information is used interchangeably, but there has been some
effort to correct household data, in order to translate it into information about individuals, for example,
by allowing for intra-household distribution (and sometimes correcting income to allow for the needs of
people of different ages or genders within the household). 
However, for some important aspects of well-being, the relevant distribution is that among
groups, not individuals, such as distribution of income between groups of different ethnicities, religions,
regions or races. We term this type of distribution horizontal, to differentiate it from the normalQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 5
vertical measures of distribution among households or individuals. Horizontal distribution is one of the
major causes of conflict between groups. It can also be directly relevant to individual well-being, where
people identify strongly with the group to which they perceive themselves as belonging. For other
purposes, such as for North-South negotiations, the appropriate measure of inequality may be average
differences among nations.
(c) Distribution within which unit?  Another issue is the unit within which inequality is assessed.
Conventionally, this unit is the nation, the obvious rationale being that this is the major policy-making
unit. But some policies are made at the local level, so that the local administrative unit would be the
relevant one. For purposes of aid and other international policies, the global level is appropriate, and for
intra-regional policies, distribution within the region.
In practice, almost all the literature relates to private income distribution among individuals
within a nation, thereby excluding many important issues. Much of this paper will do likewise, but will
return to some of the broader definitions at the end.
II.  HOW GROWTH AFFECTS DISTRIBUTION
As noted earlier, in 1955 Kuznets famously propounded the view that there is an inverted “U”
curve relating levels of per capita income to income distribution, with income distribution first becoming
more unequal, and at a later state more equal, as per capita incomes rise. Kuznets derived this from
cross-country evidence. Historical work on the changing income distribution in industrialized countries
also provided supporting evidence (Paukert, 1973). But it should be noted that the Kuznets work
relates to levels of income per capita, not to the growth rate. Moreover, further work on the Kuznets
curve has found the relationship weak, as it is dependent on the precise functional form adopted (e.g.
Anand and Kanbur, 1993a; Deininger and Squire, 1998). Bourguignon concludes: “If there is any
parabolic relationship between income inequality and GDP per capita across countries... it is probably
very weak and unstable over time... [and] longitudinal data ... seem to suggest that there is much
freedom in the way distribution in a given country may change over time” (Bourguignon, 1995: 47).
Deininger and Squire (1998) also find ‘virtually no support’ for the Kuznets hypothesis. However, there
is no uniform agreement on this. Several investigations have found some support for the Kuznets
hypothesis (e.g. Oswang, 1994; Ali, 1998; Milanovic, 1994; as well as Fishlow, 1995).
Despite its fragile empirical foundations – made even more so by the recent increase in
inequality in developed countries – the Kuznets curve has been widely accepted, and sometimes used
as an excuse, for taking no action on income distribution, on the assumption that the natural laws
represented by Kuznets will unavoidably be realized. It may, of course, be that there are ‘natural laws’
leading to a Kuznets relationship in a laissez-faire development process, but these can be countered by
policy which explains the many exceptions to the curve. It is in this spirit that it is worth briefly surveying
the explanations that have been put forward for the Kuznets relationship:QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 6
(i) In the case of a dualistic economy, with a low productivity, more egalitarian agrarian
sector, and a high productivity, less egalitarian industrial sector, development causes a
sectoral shift to occur. Consequently, inequality rises, both because of the differences in
average incomes between the sectors and because people are shifting from a less to a
more egalitarian sector. But when the whole economy becomes part of the modern
industrial sector, the inequality arising from the between-sector differences disappears,
and when full employment is reached, income inequality within the modern sector also
diminishes. This explanation, termed the Kuznets process, was developed into a formal
model by Anand and Kanbur (1993b);
(ii) Another explanation, derived from the Lewis growth model, is that productivity and
incomes growth is confined to the modern sector, where the profit share rises, while in
the stagnant traditional sector incomes remain low (and may even fall as population
growth occurs), so that between-sector inequality rises; 
(iii) A third explanation attributes the process to an initially unequal distribution of assets,
which contributes to rising inequality, as those with more assets also accumulate more;
but, eventually, the rate of return to capital falls and the unequalizing effect of capital is
offset by an equalizing effect arising from labour incomes.
Empirical work on growth (as against levels) of per capita income, however, shows no
relationship between growth rates and inequality (Ahluwalia, 1976); and recent work confirms this
(Bruno, Ravallion and Squire, 1995; UNCTAD, 1997). Histories of individual countries show that in
some countries income distribution has worsened over time (e.g. Brazil ) and in others it has improved
(e.g. Indonesia in the 1970s). In fact we can observe countries in each of the four possible quadrants
representing combinations of growth and changes in income distribution, as shown in table 1.
The conclusion, then, is that growth is ‘distribution neutral’, i.e. it does not necessarily lead to
either a worsening or an improvement in income distribution, and may be consistent with either.
Structural factors and policy stances determine countries’ experiences.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 7
3 Kaldor (1956) suggested that in a full-employment economy higher investment would lead to a
higher profit share, so that growth and inequality would be likely to be associated, although the
causation in this model ran from investment to profits/savings, not the other way round.
Table 1
Growth and distribution in different economies
High growth Low growth
Distribution worsening Brazil (1960s to early 1990s);
Pakistan (1970–1985); 
China (1980s); 
Thailand (1970s and 1980s); 
Botswana, 1970s
Post-Soviet Russia; most eastern
European countries, 1980s;
Mexico 1980s; 
Kenya 1980s; Ethiopia 1980s;
Guatemala 1970s and 1980s
Distribution improving Indonesia (1973–1993); 
Malaysia (1970–1990); 




Mauritius (1980s and 1990s)
Sri Lanka (1960–1970); 
Cuba; Colombia, 1980s; 
Morocco (1970–1984); 
Trinidad and Tobago (1970s
and 1980s)
Source: Demery et al. (1995); Chu et al. (1999).
III.  HOW INCOME DISTRIBUTION AFFECTS ECONOMIC GROWTH
In the 1950s it was assumed that more unequal income distribution led to higher growth, via
higher savings – and possibly incentive effects (e.g. Galenson and Leibenstein, 1955).3 Higher savings
propensities associated with more unequal income distribution were variously attributed to the effect of
a rising profit share (more, or only, savings out of profits, as assumed by Marx, Kaldor and Lewis), or
of more unequal household income distribution (with a Keynesian consumption function). The early
choice-of-technique literature (Dobb, 1956–57; Sen, 1968) argued that more capital-intensive
techniques should be chosen to maximize surplus and reinvestible funds. From this, the view emerged
that countries should grow first and redistribute later. This view was challenged, for example, byQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 8
4 Including Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Birdsall, Ross and Sabot, 1995; Bourguignon, 1995;
Deininger and Squire, 1996; Sarel, 1997; Larrain and Vergara, 1997.
5 Deininger and Squire (1996) produced a ‘cleaned’ data set, excluding 1,200 out of 2,000
observations. But the cleaning process inevitably introduces its own biases; for example, more equal
countries are likely to produce more reliable data on income distribution as particular groups have less
reason to conceal their incomes.
Adelman and Morris (1973), who argued that more equal initial income distribution would lead to
higher growth.
Recent literature has supported Adelman and Morris; empirical work shows that countries with
more equal income distribution have higher growth (Alesina and Perotti, 1993; Persson and Tabellini,
1994; and many others4). Owing to data constraints, most work involves cross-country regressions.
There are especially severe data problems in the area of income distribution, as under-declaration of
income is common for obvious reasons.5 Here too the robustness of the findings has been questioned,
notably by Fishlow (1995), who finds no statistically significant evidence of a relationship between
growth and equality, when a dummy variable is introduced for Latin America. However, investigations
over time in developed countries have confirmed the relationship between greater equality and higher
growth (e.g. Panizza, 1999, who investigated growth performance in states in the United States from
1920). However, the very large number of studies finding some relationship gives some confidence in
the existence of a positive relationship between equality and economic growth – and certainly refutes
the prior and opposite conclusion.
A variety of mechanisms to explain the positive relationship between income distribution and
economic growth have been suggested.
(a) One type of mechanism relates to the political economy of more or less equal societies, and
how, as a result of political developments, high inequality translates into growth-impeding
factors. For example:
(i) It is argued that higher inequality leads to more political instability, more uncertainty,
less investment and lower growth (Alesina and Perotti, 1994a; Bertola, 1993; Perotti,
1993; Persson and Tabellini, 1994);
(ii) It is suggested that higher inequality leads to populist redistributive tax policies, more
disincentive effects and lower growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and
Tabellini, 1994);
(iii) Higher inequality gives a disproportionate influence to rich groups which lobby for
preferential tax treatment, leading to over-investment in certain areas and reducing
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(b) Other explanations relate to the economic effects of higher equality/inequality:
(i) Higher equality of land ownership leads to more labour input, and higher land
productivity (e.g. Lipton, 1993). There is abundant evidence that more equal land
distribution is associated with higher agricultural productivity as well as more equally
distributed rural incomes, and in rural economies this accounts for a significant
proportion of total incomes.
(ii) Higher equality reduces poverty, and leads to more human development (nutrition,
education and health), with a more productive workforce, more innovation, etc.
(Birdsall, Ross and Sabot, Stewart and Raffirez, 1995; Ranis, 2000).
(iii) Higher equality in asset distribution leads to a more even access to credit and
information, and more opportunities for the poor to make productive investments
(Galor and Zeria, 1993; Deininger and Squire, 1998).
(iv) Higher equality leads to larger domestic markets, greater exploitation of economies of
scale and hence more industrialization and growth (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny,
1989).
(v) Higher inequality, on the other hand, leads to higher fertility, since those who are poor
and less educated have larger families, and this in turn reduces growth (Benabou, 1996;
Khoo and Dennis, 1999; Bloom et al., 1998).
These are all hypotheses, none of which have been thoroughly tested. The political economy
explanations mostly rest on an assumption about the behaviour of the ‘median voter’, which is not
relevant in non-democratic societies. Moreover, the statistical evidence supporting the positive
relationship between more equality and higher growth appears to apply to non-democratic countries,
not democratic ones, according to Deininger and Squire (1998). In addition, the model assumes that
more inequality leads to higher government spending, when in fact the reverse appears to be true
(Benabou, 1996). The ‘human development’ explanation (i.e. that more equality leads to more
education, better nutrition and health, and hence more productive people (see (v) above) is much better
supported. There is considerable evidence that a more equal income distribution leads to a greater
spread and level of education, as well as improved health and nutrition, and that this in turn brings about
higher growth (Birdsall and Sabot, 1994; Ranis et al., 2000). However, this does not seem to be the
whole story, as empirical work has found that greater equality has an independent positive impact on
growth, in addition to the impact via education levels (Birdsall and Sabot, 1994; Bourguignon, 1995).
Whatever the mechanisms – still subject to investigation – there is broad agreement on the
empirical evidence, which shows that more equality is associated with higher economic growth.
Moreover, the order of magnitude of the effect is quite high. For example, Bourguignon estimates that aQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 10
change of one standard deviation in inequality is responsible for half a percentage point of additional
growth. 
Taking the findings of sections II and III together would seem to point to the following fairly
optimistic conclusion; namely, that more egalitarian income distribution is better for growth; and that
cross-country evidence shows that growth neither increases nor decreases inequality in any systematic
way. Since more equal income distribution is desirable as an intrinsic part of the development agenda,
as a mechanism for reducing poverty and enhancing human development, and as instrumental to
growth, the agenda should be to identify which types of growth are more likely to improve income
distribution and which policies would help bring about egalitarian patterns of growth.
IV.  EGALITARIAN PATTERNS OF GROWTH
The distribution of income is the outcome of complex economic processes. Individuals’ incomes
depend on their incomes from assets and from their own current activities. Income from assets is a
function of asset ownership and the rate of return on assets; and income from current activities depends,
similarly, on quantity of, and returns to, employment (or self-employment), the returns to employment
normally being a function of the individual’s level of education and skills. For an economy as a whole,
income distribution then depends on asset distribution, distribution of human capital, and returns on
each. It is thus not surprising that we observe a large range of income distribution across countries –
contrast, for example, Brazil, where 48 per cent of the income goes to the top 10 per cent of the
population, and just 0.8 per cent of total income goes to the bottom 10 per cent, with India, where 25
per cent of the income goes to the top 10 per cent of the population, and 4.1 per cent to the bottom 10
per cent. This way of looking at income distribution indicates one rather obvious point: a large part of
any particular distribution is determined by factors inherited from the past – in particular, the stock and
distribution of capital (monetary, physical and human). Hence, unless there is very radical action
involving asset redistribution (as was taken in Taiwan; Province of China; and the Republic of Korea in
the 1950s) or the destruction or flight of human capital (as in Cambodia), we should not expect large
changes in income distribution in shortish periods of time.
Statistical investigation shows the importance of asset distribution. For example, education has
been estimated to account for 10–20 per cent of observed inequality (Fishlow, 1995); Bourguignon and
Morrisson estimate that inequality in land distribution accounts for 17 per cent of income inequality; they
also show that the abundance of mineral resources in a country has to be associated with higher
inequality (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990).
Aside from asset redistribution, changes in income distribution depend on changes in the
amount and returns to current activities, that is to say, employment of different types of labour, and
returns to that employment. The poor are invariably among those with low earnings. Some work forQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 11
long hours but at very low rates of remuneration, and others have little or no employment. Some
combination of low hours of work and low remuneration is normally found in the agriculture sector, in
the informal urban economy, and among some unskilled jobs in the formal sector. From this
perspective, growth strategies likely to improve the earnings of the poor, and hence improve income
distribution, include those which raise returns to agriculture, increase the availability of unskilled work,
and extend basic education. 
This analysis and cross-country comparisons suggest the following factors are likely to lead to
more egalitarian growth:
• Agrarian-focused strategies, especially those also favouring rural industrialization;
• Employment-intensive strategies (export-led, and/or supported by labour-intensive
employment schemes);
• High levels of and widespread education;
• Asset redistribution. This is important, not only for the immediate impact on income from
assets, but also because it influences the rest of the development strategy in a variety of
ways; for example, more equality leads to more widely spread education, and it may, lead
to mass markets for labour-intensive consumer goods rather than élite goods. The
consequent political economy tends to favour more pro-poor economic decisions;
• Government policies towards structuring the market, so that education, training, and asset
accumulation is directed towards deprived groups.
Examples of each of these approaches are presented briefly below:
(a) Agrarian-focused strategies
Considering that in the poorest countries a majority of the population works in agriculture, that
the rural sector is typically poorer than the urban one, and that the percentage of the labour force in
agriculture generally exceeds the share of agriculture in GDP, increasing the productivity of the rural
sector should clearly promote more equitable growth. Indeed, Lipton saw ‘urban bias’ as the major
source of poverty in developing countries (Lipton, 1977).
A wide range of strategies would tend to promote agrarian-focused growth. These include
reducing macroeconomic biases against agriculture, which almost always arise as countries attempt to
promote industrialization; introduce land reform; improve access to extension services, market
information and input and output markets for smallholders; develop rural infrastructure; and promote
agricultural diversification and the non-farm rural sector (e.g. through agro-processing, which has
forward and backward linkages, and can employ those with little or no land).
One study estimated that in Pakistan, in the absence of government price interventions, farm
incomes from the five major crops would have been 40 per cent higher over the 1983–1987 periodQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 12
(Dorosh and Valdes, 1990). The effect of the price interventions for the five major crops translated into
a transfer out of agriculture of 25 per cent of GDP in the 1978–1987 period. In contrast, Taiwan
Province of China had relatively moderate macro-bias against agriculture, strong and egalitarian
agricultural growth and high levels of rural industrialization (Burmeister et al., 1999).
Most countries that have done well in agriculture have taxed the sector moderately and
provided strong support for it. For example, in Malaysia, in the 1970s, total commodity taxation was
relatively low at 19 per cent of value of output, while government spending in direct support of
agriculture was 10 per cent of the sector’s value added. Malaysia had an agricultural growth rate of 5
per cent per year. By contrast, in the same decade, Ghana taxed agricultural commodities by over 60
per cent and spent only 3 per cent of value added on support – its farm output fell more than 1 per cent
per year. Similarly, Latin America taxed agriculture much more heavily than East Asia (directly and via
an overvalued exchange rate) and the growth in agricultural output and productivity was substantially
lower (Schiff and Valdes, 1992).
Rural industrialization also tends to improve income distribution. This is more likely to be
dynamic where agricultural output is rising fast, so that there are strong agriculture/non-agriculture
linkages; such linkages can also be promoted by government support for rural infrastructure and credit,
and are likely to be stronger where land distribution is more egalitarian (Ranis and Stewart, 1987).
Decomposition of the factors accounting for the increase in equality in Taiwan Province of China over
the 1960s has shown that an important element was rising household incomes from non-agricultural
sources (Fei, Ranis and Kuo, 1979).
A study in Bangladesh showed the strong impact of investment in rural infrastructure on rural
incomes. A comparison between villages which had benefited from greater provision of infrastructure
compared with those that had not, found a one-third increase in average household incomes among the
beneficiary villages. Crop income grew by 24 per cent, wage income by 92 per cent, and
livestock/fishery income by 78 per cent, all benefiting the poor. Non-farm businesses increased by 17
per cent, which benefited both the non-poor and the poor via improved non-farm employment
opportunities (World Bank, 1990).
(b) Employment-intensive strategies
Quite sharp differences can be observed in the employment-intensity of output increases. For
example, the employment elasticity with respect to output growth was estimated at plus 0.5 in East and
South-East Asia (1971–1992), compared with minus 0.5 in Latin America. Within Asia, it was higher
in some places (+0.7 in Indonesia), and lower elsewhere (for the 1980s, +0.3 in India, negative in theQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 13
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Philippines).6 In general, more rapid growth in employment is likely to be associated with more
egalitarian income distribution.
These differences are partly due to the output mix between and within sectors, and partly to
choice of technique. Rapid expansion of labour-intensive exports – observed in many Asian countries –
contributes to fast growth in employment. Policies which support this, and also favour more labour-
intensive techniques (e.g. by not subsidizing capital and by securing more credit for small enterprises)
promote employment-intensity (Stewart, 1987). Trade liberalization may increase labour-intensive
exports in countries with abundant labour, but only if infrastructure is adequate and the labour has at
least minimal education (Wood, 1994). In economies, where the dominant export is minerals or
plantation agricultural crops, trade liberalization can worsen income distribution.
Employment schemes can also contribute – for example, the Maharashtra Employment
Scheme, the very extensive employment schemes in Chile in the early 1980s, and in Bangladesh in the
1970s.
(c) Asset redistribution
A more egalitarian asset distribution not only contributes to more equality in income distribution
directly, but also indirectly by increasing the employment intensity of output in both agriculture and non-
agriculture, and strengthening domestic linkages (i.e. the demands that agriculture generates for non-
agriculture; and the demands that the formal sector generates for the products of the informal sector
(Ranis and Stewart, 1987, 1993, 1999)). More equal distribution of land also raises output – Deininger
and Squire (1997) show that a difference of one standard deviation in the initial Gini coefficient for land
is associated with income gains of 0.5 per cent for the population as a whole, with gains of 1 per cent
for the poorest 20 per cent and 0.9 per cent for the poorest 40 per cent.
A comparison between Viet Nam and Bangladesh provides an illustration: in Viet Nam,  land
distribution is much more egalitarian and there is much less landlessness; Viet Nam has experienced an
agricultural growth rate of  5 per cent per annum, compared with a rate of 2 per cent in Bangladesh
over the past decade (Ahmed and Goletti, 1998).
Land reform has been very effective in some economies (e.g. Taiwan Province of China and the
Republic of Korea, and also Egypt in the 1960s), but political obstacles are often severe. In quite a
number of countries, even though reforms have been only partially implemented, substantial land
redistribution has been achieved. (Powelson, 1984; Lipton, 1993). Moreover, even the more limited
reforms generate some improvements in rural income distribution (El-Ghonemy, 1990; Besley andQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 14
Burgess, 1998). There is a strong case for making land reform a high priority in strategies to improve
equity and growth.
With industrialization, land distribution is becoming of lesser aggregate significance, while the
distribution of industrial and financial assets is of growing importance. The public ownership of such
assets previously represented a way of moderating asset inequality, but this is no longer regarded as a
policy option. In highly unequal societies, as in South Africa, more direct policies to tackle asset
inequalities are needed. Wealth and inheritance taxation is one option. 
The distribution of credit influences accumulation and the distribution of assets. In general,
formal-sector credit tends to be biased against the low-income groups because of their lack of
collateral, while informal sources are extremely expensive. Surveys of the informal sector generally
report that less than one per cent have access to formal sector credit (see, for example, surveys quoted
in IADB, 1999; Anderson, 1982; Stewart, Thomas and de Wilde, 1990). The self-employed and
employees of micro-enterprises are generally among the lower-income groups; for example, in Latin
America it is estimated these enterprises account for 30–40 per cent of low-income earners. New
lending mechanisms, such as the group lending procedures of the Grameen Bank, can help to redirect
credit to low-income groups. 
(d) Education
According to Thompson (1998), “Considering the high payoff from investment in human capital,
the unequal distribution of education opportunities is often a more important determinant of the skewed
income distribution than is the skewed access to land”. Higher (primary and secondary) school
enrolment rates tend to be associated with lower inequality . On the basis of cross-country analysis,
Bourguignon and Morrisson estimate that a one per cent increase in the share of the labour force having
at least secondary education increases the share of income received by the bottom 40 per cent by 6 per
cent, and that received by the bottom 60 per cent by 15 per cent (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990).
One recent study (Behrman, 1993) finds that those with no schooling have a 56 per cent probability of
being among the poorest 20 per cent, while those with university training have only a 4 per cent chance.
In Brazil, an average 25-year-old in the top decile has an average of 11 years of education, while one in
the bottom decile has just two years of education (IADB, 1999).
A study of Latin America in the 1980s found that about a quarter of the inequality among
workers’ incomes was due to differences in educational levels (Psacharopoulos et al., 1996). Education
benefits the rural as well as the urban population – educated farmers are more likely to adopt new
technologies and obtain higher returns on land (shown by studies in Malaysia, the Republic of Korea
and Thailand.) Chou and Lau (1987) show that in Thailand one additional year of schooling adds about
2.5 per cent to farm output. Even in the informal sector, there seem to be high returns to education.
Returns were estimated to be as high as 33 per cent for women self-employed in the retail textile sector
in Peru, and 14 per cent for post-primary educated men in the service sector (World Bank, 1990).QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 15
Educational access and expenditure is often distributed very unevenly. Adult literacy varies from
over 80 per cent in East Asia to as little as 13 per cent in Niger, and only 36 per cent in Pakistan.
Zambia spent nearly a quarter of its educational budget on tertiary education, with an estimated
enrolment rate of 2 per cent in 1980, while Bangladesh spent 8 per cent with an enrolment rate of 3 per
cent, and the Republic of Korea also spent 8 per cent, but with a much greater enrolment rate of 48 per
cent. 
Increasing educational access improves both equity and efficiency, and can make other reforms
more effective, such as those aimed at promoting agricultural growth or labour-intensive exports. 
(e) Structuring the market
This describes a set of policies directed towards ensuring that particular deprived groups get
favoured access to assets, including education, in a market economy. A range of policies can be used
to this effect; for example, employment regulations that require enterprises to employ a certain
proportion of a targeted group, such as those introduced as part of the Africanization policies of many
newly independent African States. Restrictions can also be directed towards educational institutions (as
in the positive discrimination policies in the United States), towards banks, in the distribution of
government expenditure, and so on. 
  The Malaysian New Economic Policy is another example. In Malaysia in 1970, the majority
population (the Malays or Bumiputra) were economically the most disadvantaged section of the
population, with an average household income 40 per cent less than that of the ethnic Chinese income.
A New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced designed to improve the economic position of the
Malays. Targets were defined: 95 per cent of new lands were to be settled on Malays; at least 30 per
cent of the equity of all public companies was to be owned by Malays; educational quotas in public
institutions were specified in line with population shares; credit policies favoured Malays, with credit
allocations and more favourable interest rates.
The policy was a success from many perspectives. The employment share of Malays in
manufacturing rose from 26 per cent to 41 per cent between 1967 and 1987, with their share in
professional and technical employment rising from 47 per cent to 56 per cent; the share of ownership in
public companies rose from 4.3 per cent in 1971 to 19.4 per cent in 1988; their university enrolment
share rose from 12 per cent in 1969 to 61.8 per cent in 1988. The income gap between Malays and
other groups was almost eliminated. The success of the structured market in Malaysia in meeting its
own objectives (narrowing gaps between Malays and others) was achieved without undermining
growth, while income distribution improved. Malaysia's growth rate over the period was one of the
fastest in the world, at 6.3 per cent per annum during the period 1960–1989, while there was a marked
improvement in income distribution, with the share of income of the bottom 40 per cent rising from 11
per cent in 1970 to 14 per cent in 1987, and the share of the top 10 per cent falling from 41 per cent to
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To some extent these strategies for achieving more egalitarian growth are complements, and to
another extent, substitutes. Thus, extending education will make land reform more effective, but it can
also contribute to greater equality in the absence of land reform. A structured market generally would
improve income distribution so long as the groups targeted for improved access are relatively deprived,
but it would probably also contribute to greater efficiency only if accompanied by supportive policies
towards education and employment. The appropriate strategy partly depends on the initial conditions of
the country concerned, including resource availability, distribution of assets and particular weaknesses.
For example, in resource-rich areas, labour-intensive strategies may not be feasible, and therefore
emphasis would need to be placed on investment in human resources, innovation and upgrading
technology, so as to improve international competitiveness and generate jobs in the export sector. This
is the strategy advocated for Latin America by ECLAC in its integrated approach towards improving
social equity through changing production patterns (ECLAC, 1992). However, it seems unlikely that
this strategy alone would markedly improve income distribution without also tackling the gross
inequalities in assets prevalent in many countries in the region.
The political feasibility of the alternative approaches, their economic desirability, and their
probable impact on income distribution and development are likely to vary according to the prevailing
conditions, so any policy suggestions need to be country specific. From this perspective QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 17
Table 2
Policies adopted by economies combining growth and improved income distribution
Countries combining
growth and improved








Taiwan Province of China Land reform; agricultural focus;
rural industrialization; labour-
intensive exports; education 
6.7 0.29












Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1999; World Bank, World Development
Indicators 1997; Chu et al. (1999).
it is instructive to go back to the set of countries (shown in the earlier matrix) that combined growth with
improved income distribution, and identify the policy mix each adopted.
The adoption of the combinations of strategies shown in table 2 above explains why these
countries succeeded in achieving egalitarian growth. But one needs also to analyse the underlying
political economy to understand why the Governments of these countries chose to follow such
strategies, while others did not. Our knowledge in this area is still rather limited, but a superficial
analysis of the countries in question provides a few pointers: the Republic of Korea and Taiwan
Province of China both undertook effective land reform to counter the perceived threats from the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and mainland China respectively. For the same reason bothQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 18
were anxious to promote economic growth, and saw investment in human resources as their
opportunity, since they lacked natural resources. Both were strongly influenced by the United States
because of their history and geopolitical position, and were encouraged to switch from import-
substitution to an outward orientation at an early stage. Malaysia’s strategy was more home-grown. It
was inspired by the political imperative of improving the relative position of the majority Malays, and of
sustaining economic growth to compete with its close neighbour, Singapore. The Indonesian
Government was also partly motivated by the desire to promote local entrepreneurs relative to the
Chinese, and partly by the objective of cementing the very fissiparous country by spreading education
and health services throughout the country. The Government of Mauritius believed it was imperative to
replace its dominant export, sugar, which had poor prospects, and therefore promoted education and
the immigration of textiles entrepreneurs from Hong Kong (China) and from elsewhere, in order to
achieve this. 
V.  RECENT TRENDS IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Earlier sections have shown the desirability of more equal income distribution, and also
suggested ways of achieving this by adopting particular growth strategies, which would be especially
effective when combined with asset redistribution or structured markets. The political realism of these
strategies is shown by the large number of examples where they (or elements of them) have been put
into effect. But this rather optimistic conclusion is countered by recent trends in income distribution. 
While the direction of changes has been mixed, in the majority of countries inequality rose in the
1980s and 1990s – among developed countries, inequality rose in 15 and fell in only one
country during this period; among countries in transition, inequality rose sharply in every country; in
Latin America it rose in 8 out of 13 countries, falling in just 3; and in Asia it rose in 7 out of 10 cases.
Only in Africa, where the data are incomplete, did the falls in inequality match the rises (see table 3),
and here it has been suggested that this may have been a matter of “levelling down” (e.g. in the Côte
d’Ivoire, see UNCTAD, 1997). This rather uniform movement towards greater inequality is perfectly
consistent with the finding that the rate of growth does not affect income distribution: the rises in
inequality in recent years have affected high- and low-growth countries equally. QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 19
Table 3
Changing income distribution, 1980s to 1990s
No. of countries with
rising inequality
No. of countries with
falling inequality
No. of countries with no
change in distribution 
OECD  15 1 2
Eastern Europe
and CIS 11 0 0
Latin America 8 3 2
Asia 7 3 0
Africa 3 3 1
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1999; Stewart and Berry (1999); Morley
(1995).
It is essential to explore why inequality has been rising, if we are to determine whether a pro-
equality agenda is possible in the current world situation, and how. The context in which the rise in
equality occurred was one of increased marketization, liberalization and globalization, and rapid
information-intensive technological change, all of which affected most countries in the world in one way
or another. It seems likely that each of these broad changes contributed to the rising inequality. Clearly,
since we are dealing with a mass of heterogeneous countries, different specific reasons applied in
different situations. 
Deconstruction of the change in income distribution shows that the increased inequality was
generally due, in part, to increased inequality in wage and salary earnings, and in part, to a rise in the
profit share and a fall in the wage share, increasing the proportion of income arising from the ownership
of assets, which is invariably distributed more unequally than work income. In the OECD countries,
earnings inequality worsened in most countries (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). This also occurred in
most transition countries, but here the fall in wage share played a more important role (Cornia, 1996).
A study of changing wage dispersion from the late 1970s to the late 1980s showed a rise in the majority
of developing countries, in eight out of nine countries in Latin America, three out of five in Africa and six
out of ten in Asia (van der Hoeven, 1999; see also Berry, 1997; Robbins, 1995, 1996; and Làchler,
1997).
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(a) Freer international trade – Following the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one might expect
inequality to decrease with trade liberalization in labour-surplus developing economies, as employment
and the share of wages rise because of the expansion of exports of labour-intensive manufactures.
Indeed, this seems to have been a characteristic of the countries that combined growth with improved
equity over the longer period, as just noted. In resource-rich areas, however, tradeables are not labour
intensive; moreover, in import-substituting economies, import liberalization can undermine the wage-
earning class (Taylor and Krugman, 1978; Berry, 1997; Roemer and Guherty 1997). For example,
studies in Chile and Mexico found that openness increased the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
labour (Beyer, Rojas and Vergara, 1999; Ghiara, 1999). In some primary producing areas (African
economies largely), trade liberalization may reduce the income share of urban workers and may raise
incomes of peasant farmers, who generally have lower incomes than urban workers. But rising
differentiation within rural areas can offset this income-equalizing effect.
A number of studies have shown that trade liberalization has not benefited unskilled labour in
developing countries in any straightforward way (Davis, 1996). Earnings dispersion has tended to
increase with more trade liberalization; empirical work has shown that land- and capital-intensive
countries have a less equal income distribution, while skill-intensive countries have more equal income
distribution (Wood, 1995; Freeman and Katz, eds. 1995; Spilimbergo, Londono and Székely, 1999).
 
Freer international trade might be expected to worsen income distribution in labour-scarce
countries (i.e. the developed countries), where production of labour-intensive goods is undermined by
competition from cheap labour in developing countries. This does seem to explain some of the
deterioration in income distribution in developed countries, but the extent is open to debate; for
example, Wood (1994) attributes one third to one half of the deterioration to this, and others, such as
Leamer (1995), point to technology change as a major factor. 
(b) Technology change – The rapid pace of technology change has raised the demand for skilled
labour leading to rising income differentials among workers in both developed and developing countries
(Leamer, 1995; Láchler, 1997; Robbins, 1995,1996; Berman, Bound and Machin, 1997). The effect is
likely to be particularly acute in developed countries which specialize in technology-intensive goods and
services. But it seems also to be affecting intermediate stage economies which have moved on from
unskilled labour-intensive products (e.g. Mexico; Taiwan Province of China). 
(c) The abolition or erosion of the minimum wage – This also seems to be an element increasing
inequality in some countries. The question of the impact of minimum wages on income distribution and
poverty is a controversial one: neo-classical theory suggests a rise in the minimum wage should reduce
employment, and this could offset the impact of any rise on poverty. But Keynesian (and other)
accounts of the determination of employment challenge this conclusion. A study of changes in inequality
in Latin America in the 1980s found that the real minimum wage fell in almost every case where
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7 This is also supported by a careful marshalling of evidence by Morley (one of the authors of a
World Bank report, see 1993), whose conclusion is slightly stronger than that of the World Bank: “real
minimum wages appear to have an equalising effect on the distribution” (Morley, 1995: 162).
8 A preliminary evaluation by the Confederation of British Industry, the main employers’
organization, reports that the minimum wage introduced into Britain in April 1999 had not had adverse
effects on employment in the first five months, nor increased average earnings; it had had some effect in
reducing wage differentials, and had led to modernization of work practices (upgrading skills) in some
companies (Financial Times, 1/11/99).
minimum wages may have an equalizing effect on the income distribution” (World Bank, 1993: 26).7
The rise in wage inequality in the United States has also largely been explained by the decrease in the
minimum wage (Teulings,1998; DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996). Lustig and McCleod (1996) find
that higher minimum wages are associated with lower poverty in developing countries, though they also
lead to higher unemployment. Some evidence suggests a negative impact on employment (e.g.
Neumark and Wascher, 1991; Rama, 1996; Abowd, Kramarz and Margokis, 1999); some suggest a
switch from the formal sector to informal employment (Jones, 1998); while yet other studies show that a
rise in minimum wages is associated with no change or even a rise in employment (e.g. Card, Katz and
Krueger, 1994; Dickens et al., 1994; Card and Krueger, 1994). While, evidently, many firms disobey
minimum wage regulations – especially in developing countries – in general, the coincidence of eroding
minimum wages with worsening wage dispersion in numerous countries supports the view that minimum
wages can improve income distribution. However, clearly the level of the minimum wage needs to be
calculated carefully in line with the economic conditions of the country.8
(d) Transition from communism to capitalism – Rising inequality in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union has been “one of the biggest and fastest increases ever recorded”, according to
Milonavic (1998), with an average increase in the Gini coefficient of between 0.25 and 0.28 to between
0.35 and 0.38 in less than 10 years. This is explained by a peeling away of the factors which previously
assured a high degree of equality, including privatization of assets, reduced restrictions on earnings
differentials and a rising share of income from self-employment (including the black market) (Milanovic,
1998; Cornia, 1996).
(e) Changing functional income distribution – The functional income distribution (i.e. the shares
of factors of production) is an important determinant of household distribution, since household incomes
depend on the returns on the various assets they possess (including their labour), as well as their
quantity. Since the upper income groups own most financial and physical assets, they are likely to gain
relatively when the share of profits rises and the share of wage-income falls. For example, in Brazil – an
extreme example of an unequal society – the lowest decile of households receives 0.8 per cent of non-
labour income, compared with 47.2 per cent for the top decile (IADB, 1999). The rather limited
evidence suggests that the share of wages fell, and that of profits rose, in the majority of countries over
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1979 to 1989, the exceptions being Norway and Japan, and the biggest rises in profits took place in
Australia, Belgium, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Glyn, 1992). Comparisons between the periods
1985–1992 and 1975–1980 show that among developing countries the share of wages in
manufacturing fell in five Latin American countries and rose in three (comparing 1985–1992 with
1975–1980), with the biggest falls being in Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela; among Asian
economies, it fell in four and rose in six, with big falls in Pakistan and Sri Lanka; and in Africa and the
Mediterranean it fell in seven and rose in one, with the largest falls in Ghana and Turkey (UNCTAD,
1997). There was thus a broad coincidence between changes in the functional distribution and changes
in the household income distribution, suggesting that the former is partly responsible for the latter. One
then needs to explain why the functional distribution has changed in this way. It is not possible to do this
here in any depth, but the process of globalization and liberalization, and possibly the new technologies
creating Schumpeterian profits, seem likely factors. 
(f) Globalization in general can be expected to increase returns to capital, especially in the
context of a rapid reduction in restrictions on capital movements, while restrictions on the movements of
unskilled labour are maintained. In developed countries, capital-intensive processes gain through trade
specialization, and capital-owners gain by their ability to export capital; in capital-importing countries,
liberalization alone should decrease returns to capital, as the ‘supply’ of capital rises relative to labour,
but this may be offset by privatization, reduced regulation, etc., all of which tend to raise the gross
returns to capital, as well as changes in the tax system favouring capital, which tend to raise the net
returns. Globalization has decreased the bargaining power of labour and increased the power of capital,
because capital (and goods) can move around the world relatively freely, while there are severe
restrictions on the movement of labour, especially unskilled labour. Consequently, labour is discouraged
from bargaining in case it frightens off capital and thus reduces employment. This may explain why there
has been a worldwide decline in Trade Union membership (van der Hoeven, 1999). 
VI.  WIDENING THE DIMENSIONS OF INEQUALITY: IMPLICATIONS
At the beginning of the paper we pointed to the need to consider a broader set of indicators
than simply pre-tax private household income, to which most of the previous discussion was related. A
first requirement is to look at intra-household income distribution; secondly, post-tax income
distribution; thirdly, the impact of state transfers (pensions etc.); fourthly, to include social income (i.e.
publicly provided goods, services), which is an extremely important component of human well-being;
and, fifthly, it would be desirable to examine the distribution of more direct measures of well-being,
such as health, nutrition, and even happiness. This paper does not go far in these directions, but points
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(a) Intra-household income distribution
Uneven distribution of income within the household (by gender, age) greatly increases overall
inequality among individuals; however, because the needs of people of different gender and age differ, it
is difficult to determine what an equal distribution would look like. For example, one study suggests that
allowing for intra-household income distribution increases inequality by 30–40 per cent (Haddad and
Kanbur, 1990). Policies to counter inequality should include policies directed at correcting household
inequality, for example, by improving female educational and earning opportunities.
(b) Post-tax income distribution
 
Numerous studies of the progressivity, or otherwise, of tax systems have come to differing
conclusions, partly due to differences in methodology. On balance, there appears to be mild
progressiveness in the tax systems, with very few cases in which post-tax income distribution is more
unequal than pre-tax. For example, Shah and Whalley (1990 and 1991), surveying seven tax incidence
studies in developing countries, showed that mostly the tax systems were mildly progressive. A more
recent survey of studies in developing countries found that 13 out of 36 cases were progressive, seven
proportional and seven regressive, with income tax being almost invariably progressive (Chu, Davoodi
and Gupta, 1999). But it seems that on balance the progressiveness of tax systems has been falling, with
a declining proportion of income tax (Chu, Davoodi and Gupta, 1999; Atkinson, 1999). Tanzi (1995)
notes a general decline in rates of individual and corporation income tax. However, some developing
countries – including Jamaica, Turkey and Indonesia – managed to reduce inequality significantly
through the tax system (Chu, Davoodi and Gupta, 1999). 
(c) State transfers
These include pensions and other state benefits, such as unemployment or disability benefits,
which, in principle, can be substantial. Transfers are large and generally redistributive in many
developed countries. But they are typically small, with less clear distributional implications, in
developing countries because benefits are often largely confined to the relatively privileged formal sector
workers. In Latin America such systems have been shown to be regressive in some cases (Mesa-
Largo, 1983). However, when appropriately designed they can be highly redistributive (e.g. means-
tested widows’ pensions and disability pensions introduced in Tamil Nadu (see Guhan, 1992; Dreze
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9 However, government expenditure is often not ‘well-targeted’, when this is defined as occurring
where the poor receive a higher proportion of benefits than their share of population (Chu, Davoodi
and Gupta, 1999).
10 Grunberg (1998) explores the forces that reduce revenue as a result of globalization – including
the reduction in trade taxes; financial liberalization, the globalization of income; tax competition, leading
to a general fall in tax rates on individuals and companies; and the growth of the (untaxed) informal
economy. Her aggregate evidence for the 1980s shows a small fall in the proportion of national income
going to Government in developing countries, but a quite significant rise in developed countries.
(d) Social income
 Most government expenditure is progressive compared with pre-tax incomes.9 Despite the fact
that a substantial proportion of benefits from social expenditure invariably goes to upper-income
groups, expenditure on health and education is almost always progressive (i.e. more equally distributed
than pre-tax incomes): 31 out of 55 studies show that government education expenditure is progressive,
and 30 out of 38 studies show health expenditure is progressive. But there is considerable diversity
among countries. For example, in Guinea the bottom fifth of households receives 5 per cent of school
expenditure and the top fifth receives 44 per cent, while in Costa Rica, the bottom fifth receives 18 per
cent and the top fifth 20 per cent; the poorest fifth of the population receives 4 per cent of total health
expenditures in Guinea, compared with 30 per cent in Costa Rica (Castro-Leal et al., quoted in
Mehrotra et al., 1999). As is well known, expenditure on primary education is most progressive and
expenditure on tertiary education is often regressive. For the most part, the limited evidence shows
some improvement in the progressivity of the distribution of public expenditure over time.
Taking the evidence on tax and government expenditure incidence together, since taxation is
normally either progressive or neutral and expenditure is normally progressive, we can conclude that
higher taxation and expenditure can generally be expected to improve the distribution of welfare. This is
an important conclusion and counters the widespread image that elites monopolize government
expenditures, and that, therefore, less government taxation and expenditure is more progressive than
more. It follows that downward pressure on government taxation and expenditure – associated with
globalization and the liberalizing agenda – is likely to worsen post-tax, post-benefit income
distribution.10 
(e) The distribution of non-monetary indicators of well-being
Although there has been considerable progress in widening the definition and measure of
progress beyond monetary income at a national level, notably with the UNDP Human Development
Index, much less attention has been paid to the distribution of non-monetary aspects of well-being.
Piecemeal evidence shows considerable inequalities in health and education. For example, the poorest
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of civil servants in the United Kingdom found that death rates were three times as high among the
lowest grades compared with the highest grades (Wilkinson, 1996). In the United States, age-adjusted
mortality rates were found to be over 80 per 10,000 in the bottom decile of the white male population,
compared with under 40 in the top decile (Davey Smith, Neaton and Stamler, 1996). In Brazil, infant
mortality rates range from 90 per 1,000 to 12 per 1,000 in different areas of the same city. Similar
differences are found for schooling, with, for example, nearly 60 per cent of the bottom quintile never
having attended school in Nepal, compared with 13 per cent of the top quintile. In Brazil all the top 30
per cent of the income distribution have attended school, while a fifth of the bottom 10 per cent have
never attended school. Although the extent of inequalities in non-monetary indicators tends to be
smaller than monetary income dispersion, their importance for well-being, as well as a precondition of
improving future incomes, is likely to be greater. 
There is strong two-way causation between the distribution of monetary income and the
distribution of human development achievements. Societies with more unequal income distribution have
higher death rates than those with similar incomes and more equal distribution. Indeed, among
developed countries it is the equality of income distribution, not income levels, which are associated
with longevity (Wilkinson, 1996). A positive relationship between income equality and longevity has
also been found in developing countries (Flegg, 1982). Indeed, some research shows that infant
mortality rates increase with rising incomes if the level of income among the lowest fifth of the
population is kept constant (Waldmann, 1992). Inequality as such worsens health. Conversely, more
inequality in health and education is likely to lead to more unequal income distribution in monetary
incomes.
VII.  HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY: THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION
So far we have considered only vertical inequality, i.e. the inequality among individuals or
households in a society. Horizontal inequality, or inequality among groups is also of huge importance
to societal well-being. Groups may be defined culturally and/or geographically, e.g. by ethnicity, race,
religion, or location. The extent of inequality among such groups is a key determinant of social cohesion.
There are many relevant aspects of such inequality, including inequality in income, assets, employment,
access to social income and resources.
Horizontal inequalities are a major factor contributing to social instability and ultimately civil
war. A graphic example was the Rwanda situation, where the Belgian colonialists had divided Tutsi and
Hutu and given them unequal access to most types of resources. Similar horizontal inequalities are to be
found in many other conflict-prone places, such as between Protestants and Catholics in Northern
Ireland, Tamils and Singhalese in Sri Lanka and Muslims and Christians in Serbia. Horizontal
inequalities are more likely to lead to conflict where they occur systematically along a number of
dimensions, and where they are growing (see Stewart, forthcoming, 2000). For economies vulnerable
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inequalities is essential to prevent violent group conflict. Yet in practice, horizontal inequality is rarely
identified or measured systematically. It should be noted that there can be a high degree of vertical
inequality without substantial horizontal inequality if within a group inequality is high; however, generally,
if a society has high horizontal inequality, vertical inequality is likely to be substantial. Given the heavy
human costs of conflict, as well as the economic costs, tackling horizontal inequalities may be at least as
important as reducing vertical inequality.
VIII.  GLOBAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION
So far we have focused entirely on income distribution within countries, which is of interest to
national policy makers, and which determines the cohesion of a particular society. Global income
distribution is of relevance to international policy makers concerned with matters such as aid
distribution, the terms of trade and debt relief. As other papers in this Round Table focus on this area
(for example, see Maizels and Nayyar), here we review developments briefly for the sake of getting a
more complete picture.
World income distribution is substantially more unequal than that of particular countries, since it
encompasses the big differences in income between countries as well as within them. According to an
UNCTAD estimate, the top 20 per cent of the world population received 83 per cent of world income
in 1990, and the world Gini coefficient was 0.74 (UNCTAD, 1997). Trends in the distribution of world
income depend on the evolution of both inter-country income differences (i.e. between-country
inequality) and the distribution of income within countries. Most analyses suggest that inter-country
income differences are the main contributor to the inequality which exists among the people of the world
(Berry et al., 1991), while changes in world distribution are likely to be much more influenced by
changes in inter-country income gaps than changes in intra-country inequality, because the former are
so large and because they appear to change more quickly than do the intra-country gaps. 
Berry, Bourguignon and Morrisson concluded that there was little change in the standard
indicators of income inequality over the period 1950–1977. An important aspect of the evolution of
world distribution over this period was the fast growth of the largest low-income country, China.
Estimates of distribution of income within the non-socialist world showed increases in inequality, with
the bottom deciles losing together with the middle ones. In the period 1980 to date, the evidence
suggests worsening world inequality with inter-country differences increasing. According to UNDP
(1999), while 33 countries had growth rates in GNP per capita of over 3 per cent per annum for
1980–1997, 59 countries had negative growth. For the decade of the 1980s, UNCTAD estimates that
the world Gini coefficient rose from 0.68 in 1980 to 0.74 in 1990. This in fact underestimates the level
and change in inequality because it includes only changes in distribution between countries, and does
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Thus the impact of globalization seems to have been unequalizing between nations as well as
within them. To some extent other influences were also responsible, such as the increase in the
technology-intensity of production, and the rise in the rate of return to capital. Yet other influences, such
as worsening commodity terms of trade, were more relevant to explaining rising inter-country
inequalities than intra-country. 
IX.  CONCLUSIONS
There is broad empirical and theoretical support for the view that greater equality of income
distribution is good for economic growth, for social cohesion, for poverty elimination and for health; in
other words, that in general, more equality promotes development. It seems, therefore, that greater
equality of income distribution is to be recommended on all counts. Yet the current situation is one of
rising inequality in the majority of countries, both among developed and developing countries, which
associated with globalization and liberalization. 
The evidence also suggests that Governments can influence income distribution by their policies
towards asset distribution, by the growth strategy chosen and by tax and expenditure policies. In
general, higher levels of taxation and expenditure improve the distribution compared with the pre-tax
system, even where the tax system is not notably progressive. Well designed, tax, expenditure and
transfer policies can greatly improve the distribution of welfare. Within limits, also, empirical evidence
suggests that higher taxes do not impede economic growth. Yet globalization is restricting
Governments’ ability to counter the rise in inequality of primary monetary incomes by redistributive
taxation and expenditure because of the feared impact on competitiveness, trade and capital
movements. There is a sad irony in the situation because the rise in inequality and downward pressure
on government expenditure is likely to reduce political stability, and also diminish essential expenditure
on social and economic infrastructure, essential for sustained growth and social stability. A major policy
challenge for the twenty-first century will be to tackle this dilemma. 
One general conclusion from this is that coordinated regional, or better international, action
would help promote equality without weakening the ability to compete. For example, regional
coordination of domestic tax and benefit strategies would permit improved distribution without
undermining competitiveness, as would regional coordination of minimum wages at an appropriate level.
At an international level, coordinated taxation of international capital flows (including taxation of short-
term capital and of multinational companies) and support for universal human rights to minimal
standards of living would also contribute to improving income distribution, and countering the
immiserizing impact which globalization can have. A global economic environment requires a global
social response. In general, the liberalizing and globalizing era of the late twentieth century has tilted the
balance of power and benefits towards those with capital (physical, human and financial) against those
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However, while a regional and global response is needed, much can be done at the national
level. Countries which have put human development and improved income distribution high on the
agenda, have not lost out in the global economy because the build up of human resources enhances
their productivity. The types of policies likely to improve income distribution were identified above.
They include agrarian-focused and employment-intensive growth strategies; high and widely spread
expenditure on education; redistribution of assets; a structured market to direct education, training, and
asset accumulation towards deprived groups; and strong policies towards social protection and social
income. Gender balance in each aspect is necessary to improve intra-household income distribution. It
is essential to consider not just vertical income distribution but intra-household and horizontal
inequalities as well.
Nonetheless, although it is fairly easy to identify the appropriate set of policies which would
increase equality and improve social cohesion and economic growth, the prevalence of powerful global
forces responsible for the general rise in inequality makes it difficult to be optimistic about the
possibilities of countries switching to a more egalitarian pattern of development.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS37 Page 29
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